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Non-normal modalities in variants of Linear Logic∗
Daniele Porello† Nicolas Troquard‡
Abstract
This article presents modal versions of resource-conscious logics. We
concentrate on extensions of variants of Linear Logic with one minimal
non-normal modality. In earlier work, where we investigated agency in
multi-agent systems, we have shown that the results scale up to logics
with multiple non-minimal modalities. Here, we start with the language
of propositional intuitionistic Linear Logic without the additive disjunc-
tion, to which we add a modality. We provide an interpretation of this
language on a class of Kripke resource models extended with a neighbour-
hood function: modal Kripke resource models. We propose a Hilbert-style
axiomatization and a Gentzen-style sequent calculus. We show that the
proof theories are sound and complete with respect to the class of modal
Kripke resource models. We show that the sequent calculus admits cut
elimination and that proof-search is in PSPACE. We then show how to
extend the results when non-commutative connectives are added to the
language. Finally, we put the logical framework to use by instantiating
it as logics of agency. In particular, we propose a logic to reason about
the resource-sensitive use of artefacts and illustrate it with a variety of
examples.
Keywords: modal logics; resource-conscious logics; agency; artefacts
1 Introduction
Logics for resources and modalities each got their share of the attention and
have also already been studied together. Besides the seminal work on intuition-
istic modal logic in [35, 44], modalities for substructural implications have been
studied in [13] and extensions of intuitionistic Linear Logic with modalities have
been investigated for example in [31, 23]. Moreover, modal versions of logics for
resources that are related to Linear Logic have been provided in [42, 41, 12].
Modalities in substructural logics are thus not new, although with one im-
portant detail: to our knowledge, modalities in sub-structural logics have always
∗This article greatly extends an earlier paper which appeared in the proceedings of the
21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2014, [39].
†Laboratory for Applied Ontology, ISTC-CNR, Trento, Italy.
daniele.porello@loa.istc.cnr.it
‡Algorithmic, Complexity and Logic Laboratory, Universite´ Paris-Est, Cre´teil, France.
troquard@loa.istc.cnr.it
1
been restricted to normal modalities. Modalities that are not normal have been
confined to the realm of classical logic.
Normal modalities are the modalities within a logic that is at least as strong
as the standard modal logic K. Non-normal modalities on the other hand are
the modalities that fail to satisfy some of the principles of the standard modal
logic K. They cannot be evaluated over a Kripke semantics but one typical se-
mantics, neighbourhood models, rely on possible worlds. They were introduced
independently by Scott and Montague. Early results were offered by Segerberg.
Chellas built upon and gave a textbook presentation in [10].
The significance of non-normal modal logics and their semantics in modern
developments in logics of agents has been emphasised before [2]. Indeed many
logics of agents are non-normal and neighbourhood semantics allows for defining
the modalities that are required to model a number of application domains:
logics of coalitional power [34], epistemic logics without omniscience [48, 30],
logics of agency [19], etc.
Let us briefly present some features of reasoning about agency specifically.
Modalities of agency aimed at modelling the result of an action have been largely
studied in the literature in practical philosophy and in multi-agent systems
[24, 40, 19, 5, 46]. Logics of agency assume a set of agents, and to each agent
i associate a modality Ei. We read Eiϕ as “agent i brings about ϕ”. With the
notable exception of Chellas’ logic [9], it is generally accepted in logics of agency
that no agent ever brings about a tautology. This is because when i brings about
ϕ, it is intended that ϕ might have not be the case if it were not for i’s very
agency. Classically, it corresponds to the axiom ¬Ei⊤. This principle is enough
for the logic of the modality Ei to be non-normal as it is inconsistent with the
necessitation rule. A normal modal logic for agency would also dictate that if i
does ϕ then she also does ϕ∨ψ. This is refuted in general on the same grounds
as Ross’ paradox. For instance, purposefully doing that I am rich should not
imply purposefully doing that I am rich or unhealthy.
In classical logic, Eiϕ allows one to capture that agent i brings about the
state of affairs ϕ. Moving from states of affairs to resources, it is then interesting
to lift these modalities from classical logic to resource-conscious logic. In doing
so, one can capture with EiA that agent i brings about the resource A.
To make a start with this research program, we will combine intuitionistic
fragments of Linear Logic with non-normal modalities. Linear Logic [17] is a
resource-conscious logic that allows for modelling the constructive content of
deductions in logic. An intuitionistic version of Linear Logic, as the one we will
work with, has a number of desirable features. One that is simple and yet greatly
appreciated is that in intuitionistic sequent calculus every sequent has a single
“output” formula. This feature favours the modelling of input-output processes.
It will prove particularly adequate for our application to agency and artefacts as
it provides a simple mechanism for the compositionality of individual artefacts’
functions into complex input-output processes.
The resource-sensitive nature of Linear Logic can be viewed as the absence
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of structural rules in the sequent calculus. Linear Logic rejects the global valid-
ity of weakening (W), that amounts to a monotonicity of the entailment, and
contraction (C), that is responsible for arbitrary duplications of formulas, e.g.,
A→ A ∧ A is a tautology in classical logic, and so is A ∧ A→ A.
Γ ⊢ A (W)
Γ, B ⊢ A
Γ, B,B ⊢ A
(C)
Γ, B ⊢ A
Γ, A,B ⊢ C
(E)
Γ, B,A ⊢ C
Accordingly, the linear implication⊸ encodes resource-sensitive deductions,
for example from A and A⊸ B we can infer B, by modus ponens, but we are
not allowed to conclude B from A, A, and A ⊸ B. Exchange (E) still holds.
(Although we will later restrict it.) Hence, contexts of formulas Γ in sequent
calculus are considered multisets. By dropping weakening and contraction, we
are led to define two non-equivalent conjunctions with different behaviours: the
multiplicative conjunction ⊗ (tensor) and the additive conjunction & (with).
The intuitive meaning of ⊗ is that an action of type A ⊗ B can be performed
by summing the resources that are relevant to perform A and to perform B.
The unit 1 is the neutral element for ⊗ and can represent a null action. A
consequence of the lack of weakening is that A⊗B no longer implies A, namely
the resources that are relevant to perform A⊗B may not be relevant to perform
just A. The absence of contraction means that A⊸ A ⊗ A is no longer valid.
The additive conjunction A & B expresses an option, the choice to perform A
or B. Accordingly A & B ⊸ A and A & B ⊸ B hold in Linear Logic, the
resources that enable the choice between A and B are relevant also to make A
or to make B. The linear implication A ⊸ B expresses a form of causality,
for example “If I strike a match, I light the room” the action of striking a
match is consumed, in the sense that it is no longer available after the room is
lighted. Linear implication and multiplicative conjunction interact naturally so
that (A⊗ (A⊸ B))⊸ B is valid.
Linear Logic operators have been applied to a number of topics in knowl-
edge representation and multiagent systems such as planning [26], preference
representation and resource allocation [20, 37, 38], social choice [36], actions
modelling [7], and narrative generation [32].
These propositional operators are very useful when talking about resources
and agency. They allow one to capture the following notions:
• Bringing about both A and B together: Ei(A ⊗ B). In such a way that
Ei(A⊗B) implies A⊗B, but does not imply A alone.
• Bringing about an option between A and B: Ei(A & B). In such a way
that Ei(A&B) implies A and implies B, but does not imply A⊗B.
• Bringing about the transformation of the resource A into the resource B:
Ei(A⊸ B). In such as way that A⊗ Ei(A⊸ B) implies B.
The only structural rule that holds in Linear Logic is exchange (E), that is
responsible for the commutativity of the multiplicative operators and amounts
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to forgetting sequentiality of actions, e.g., A⊗B → B ⊗A. We will see in this
paper how to deal with ordered information. We will still admit exchange for the
two conjunctions & and ⊗ (commutative conjunctions), but we will introduce
a non-commutative counterpart ⊙ to the multiplicative ⊗. The formula A⊙B
is not equivalent to B ⊙ A. Since ⊙ is non-commutative, we can have two
order-sensitive linear implications (noted in [28] \ and /).
For agency in multi-agent systems, resources must often become available at
key points in a series of transformations. The order of resource production and
transformation becomes quickly relevant. It is then interesting to talk about:
• Bringing about the resource A first, then B: Ei(A ⊙ B). In such a way
that Ei(A⊙B) is not equivalent to Ei(B ⊙A).
• Bringing about the order-sensitive transformation of the resource from A
into B: Ei(A \ B). In such a way that A ⊙ Ei(A \ B) implies B, but
Ei(A \B)⊙A does not.
These considerations motivate us to investigate the theoretical underpin-
nings of modal versions of resource-conscious logics with the listed propositional
operators.
We will first concentrate on extensions with one minimal non-normal modal-
ity. In a second part, where we address modalities of agency, we will exploit
our results that will naturally scale up to logics with multiple non-minimal (but
still non-normal) modalities.
Outline. In Section 2, we present the Kripke resource models which already
exist in the literature. The semantics of all the languages studied in this paper
will be adequate extensions of Kripke resource models. We first enrich the
Kripke resource models with neighbourhood functions to capture non-normal
modalities. We obtain what we simply coin modal Kripke resource models. We
define and study a minimal non-normal modal logic, MILL. We introduce a
Hilbert system in Section 3 and a sequent calculus in Section 4; Both are shown
sound and complete. Moreover, we can easily show that the sequent calculus
admits cut elimination that provides a normal form for proofs. Proof search is
proved to be in PSPACE.
We extend our framework in Section 5 to account for partially commutative
Linear Logic that allows for integrating commutative and non-commutative op-
erators.
Then in Section 6 we instantiate the minimal modal logic with a resource-
sensitive version of the logics of bringing-it-about: RSBIAT. Again, sound and
complete Hilbert system and sequent calculus are provided. Proof-search in
RSBIAT is PSPACE-easy. We also show how RSBIAT can be extended with
the non-commutative language and thus represent sequentiality of actions. In
Section 7, we motivate and discuss a number of applications of our system to
represent and reason about artefacts.
4
2 MILL and modal Kripke resource models
Let Atom be a non-empty set of atomic propositions. We introduce the most
basic language studied in this paper. The language LMILL is given by the BNF:
A ::= 1 | p | A⊗A | A&A | A⊸ A | A
where p ∈ Atom. It is a modal version of what corresponds to the language of
propositional intuitionistic Linear Logic, but without the additive disjunction
and the additive units. This propositional part can also be seen as the fragment
of BI [33] without additive disjunction and implication.
Let us first concentrate on the propositional part for which a semantics
already exists in the literature. We call the logic ILL and LILL its language. A
Kripke-like class of models for ILL is basically due to Urquhart [47]. A Kripke
resource frame is a structureM = (M, e, ◦,≥), where (M, e, ◦) is a commutative
monoid with neutral element e, and ≥ is a pre-order on M . The frame has to
satisfy the condition of bifunctoriality: if m ≥ n, and m′ ≥ n′, then m◦m′ ≥ n◦
n′. To obtain a Kripke resource model, a valuation on atoms V : Atom→ P(M)
is added. It has to satisfy the heredity condition: if m ∈ V (p) and n ≥ m then
n ∈ V (p).
The truth conditions of LILL in the Kripke resource modelM = (M, e, ◦,≥, V )
of the formulas of the propositional part are the following:
m |=M p iff m ∈ V (p).
m |=M 1 iff m ≥ e.
m |=M A⊗B iff there exist m1 and m2 such that m ≥ m1 ◦m2 and m1 |=M A
and m2 |=M B.
m |=M A&B iff m |=M A and m |=M B.
m |=M A⊸ B iff for all n ∈M , if n |=M A, then n ◦m |=M B.
Observe that heredity can be shown to extend naturally to every formula,
in the sense that:
Proposition 1. For every formula A ∈ LILL, if m |= A and m′ ≥ m, then
m′ |= A.
Notations. An intuitionistic negation can be added to the language. We sim-
ply choose a designated atom ⊥ ∈ Atom and decide to conventionally interpret
⊥ as indicating a contradiction. Negation is then defined by means of implica-
tion as ∼ A ≡ A⊸ ⊥ [25]: the occurrence of A yields the contradiction. There
will be no specific rule for negation.
Given a multiset of formulas, it will be useful to combine them into a unique
formula. We adopt the following notation: ∅∗ = 1, and ∆∗ = A1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Ak
when ∆ = {A1, . . . , Ak}.
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Denote ||A||M the extension of A inM, i.e. the set of worlds ofM in which
A holds. A formula A is true in a model M if e |=M A.1 A formula A is valid
in Kripke resource frames, noted |= A, iff it is true in every model.
Modal Kripke resource models. Now, to give a meaning to the modality,
we define a neighbourhood semantics on top of the Kripke resource frame. A
neighbourhood function is a mapping N : M → P(P(M)) that associates a
world m with a set of sets of worlds. (See [10].) We define:
m |= A iff ||A|| ∈ N(m)
This is not enough, though. It is possible that m |= A, yet m′ 6|= A for
some m′ ≥ m. That is, Proposition 1 does not hold with the simple extension
of |= for LMILL. (One disastrous consequence is that the resulting logic does not
satisfy the modus ponens or the cut rule.) We could define the clause concerning
the modality alternatively as: m |= A iff there is n ∈ M , such that m ≥ n
and ||A|| ∈ N(n). However, it will be more agreeable to keep working with the
standard definition and instead impose a condition on the models.
We will require our neighbourhood function to satisfy the condition that if
some set X ⊆ M is in the neighbourhood of a world, then X is also in the
neighbourhood of all “greater” worlds.2 Formally, our modal Linear Logic is
evaluated over the following models:
Definition 1. A modal Kripke resource model is a structure M = (M, e, ◦,≥
, N, V ) such that:
• (M, e, ◦,≥) is a Kripke resource frame;
• N is a neighbourhood function such that:
if X ∈ N(m) and n ≥ m then X ∈ N(n) (1)
It is readily checked that Proposition 1 is true as well for LMILL over modal
Kripke resource models for modal formulas. We thus have:
Proposition 2. For every formula A ∈ LMILL, if m |= A and m
′ ≥ m, then
m′ |= A.
Proof. We handle the new case A = B. Suppose m |= B and m′ ≥ m. By
definition, ||B|| ∈ N(m), and thus ||B|| ∈ N(m′) follows from condition (1).
Therefore m′ |= B.
3 Hilbert system for MILL and soundness
This part extends the Hilbert system for ILL from [45] and [3]. We define
the Hilbert-style calculus H-MILL for MILL by defining the following notion of
deduction.
1When no confusion can arise we will write ||A|| instead of ||A||M, and m |= A instead of
m |=M A.
2An analogous yet less transparent condition was used in [13] for a normal modality.
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A⊸ A
(A⊸ B)⊸ ((B ⊸ C)⊸ (A⊸ C))
(A⊸ (B⊸ C))⊸ (B⊸ (A⊸ C))
A⊸ (B ⊸ A⊗B)
(A⊸ (B⊸ C))⊸ (A⊗B⊸ C)
1
1⊸ (A⊸ A)
(A&B)⊸ A
(A&B)⊸ B
((A⊸ B) & (A⊸ C))⊸ (A⊸ B & C)
Table 1: Axiom schemata in H-MILL
Definition 2 (Deduction in H-MILL). A deduction tree in H-MILL D is induc-
tively constructed as follows. (i) The leaves of the tree are assumptions A ⊢H A,
for A ∈ LMILL, or ⊢H B where B is an axiom in Table 1 (base cases).
(ii) We denote by
D
Γ ⊢H A a deduction tree with conclusion Γ ⊢H A. If D and
D′ are deduction trees, then the following are deduction trees (inductive steps).
D
Γ ⊢H A
D′
Γ′ ⊢H A⊸ B
⊸-rule
Γ,Γ′ ⊢H B
D
Γ ⊢H A
D′
Γ ⊢H B
&-rule
Γ ⊢H A&B
D
⊢H A⊸ B
D′
⊢H B ⊸ A
(re)
⊢H A⊸B
We sometimes refer to the ⊸-rule as modus ponens. We say that A is
deducible from Γ in H-MILL and we write Γ ⊢H-MILL A iff there exists a deduction
tree in H-MILL with conclusion Γ ⊢H A. The deduction without assumptions,
i.e. ⊢H-MILL A, is just a special case of the above definition.
In general when defining Hilbert systems for linear logics, we need to be
careful in the definition of derivation from assumptions: since Γ is a multiset,
we need to handle occurrences of hypothesis when applying for instance modus
ponens. From Definition 2, every occurrence of assumptions or axioms in a
derivation, except for the conclusion, is used exactly once by an application
of modus ponens [3]. With respect to this notion of derivation, the deduction
theorem holds.
Theorem 3 (Deduction theorem for H-MILL). If Γ, A ⊢H-MILL B then
Γ ⊢H-MILL A⊸ B.
Proof. The deduction theorem holds for the propositional fragment ILL, see [45,
pp. 66-68]. The only case to consider is the rule (re). However this trivially
holds because the contexts of the sequents in the rule are empty.
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Remark. We defined the rule (re) in that particular way because of the deduc-
tion theorem. With the above formulation, the deduction theorem is preserved
in MILL. Moreover, by our definition of deduction tree, this version entails the
rule (re’): from two deductions trees with conclusion A ⊢H B and B ⊢H A, we
can build a deduction tree with conclusion A ⊢H B.
We claim that (re) implies (re’). Assume the premises of (re’): there
are two deduction trees with conclusions A ⊢H B and B ⊢H A. In virtue of
Theorem 3 and the definition of ⊢H-MILL, we know there are two trees with con-
clusions ⊢H A⊸ B and ⊢H B ⊸ A. Thus by (re), we can build a deduction
tree with conclusion ⊢H A ⊸ B. Together with A ⊢H A (a leaf), the
⊸-rule gives us a deduction tree with conclusion A ⊢H B.
With the version (re’), the deduction theorem fails, as we do not have any
axiom that talks about the modality in this case.
We can prove the soundness of H-MILL wrt. our semantics.
Theorem 4 (Soundness of H-MILL). If Γ ⊢H-MILL A then, for every model, Γ |=
A (namely, e |= (Γ)∗ ⊸ A).
Proof. We only give the arguments of the proof of soundness for two represen-
tative cases.
Soundness of⊸-rule. We show now that⊸-rule preserves validity. Namely,
we prove, by induction on the length of the derivation tree that if (1) e |= Γ⊸ A
and (2) e |= Γ′⊸ (A⊸ B), then e |= Γ⊗Γ′⊸ B. The first assumption entails
that for all x, if x |= Γ, then x |= A. The second assumption entails that for all
y, if y |= Γ′, then y |= A⊸ B. Thus, for all t, if t |= A, then y ◦ t |= B.
Let z |= Γ ⊗ Γ′, thus there exist z1 and z2 such that z1 |= Γ, z2 |= Γ′ and
z ≥ z1 ◦ z2. By (1), we have that z1 |= A and, by (2), z2 |= A ⊸ B, thus
z1 ◦ z2 |= B, and by Proposition 2 we have that z |= B.3
Soundness of (re). We show that (re) preserves validity, namely, if e |= A⊸
B and e |= B ⊸ A, then e |= A⊸ B. Our assumptions imply that, for all
x, if x |= A, then x |= B, and if x |= B then x |= A. Thus, ||A|| = ||B||. We
need to show that for all x, if x |= A, then x |= B. By definition, x |= A iff
||A|| ∈ N(x). Thus, since ||A|| = ||B||, we have that ||B|| ∈ N(x), that means
x |= B.
4 Sequent calculus MILL and completeness
In this section, we introduce the sequent calculus for our logic. A sequent is
a statement Γ ⊢ A where Γ is a finite multiset of occurrences of formulas of
MILL and A is a formula. The fact that we allow for a single formula in the
conclusions of the sequent corresponds to the fact that we are working with the
intuitionistic version of the calculus [17].
3Remember that Proposition 2 holds for the modal language LMILL because of Condition (1)
on modal Kripke resource models.
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ax
A ⊢ A
Γ, A ⊢ C Γ′ ⊢ A
cut
Γ,Γ′ ⊢ C
Γ, A,B ⊢ C
⊗L
Γ, A⊗B ⊢ C
Γ ⊢ A Γ′ ⊢ B
⊗R
Γ,Γ′ ⊢ A⊗B
Γ ⊢ A Γ′, B ⊢ C
⊸L
Γ′,Γ, A⊸ B ⊢ C
Γ, A ⊢ B
⊸R
Γ ⊢ A⊸ B
Γ, A,Γ′ ⊢ C
&L
Γ, A&B,Γ′ ⊢ C
Γ, B,Γ′ ⊢ C
&L
Γ, A&B,Γ′ ⊢ C
Γ ⊢ A Γ ⊢ B
&R
Γ ⊢ A&B
Γ ⊢ C
1L
Γ,1 ⊢ C
1R
⊢ 1
A ⊢ B B ⊢ A
(re)
A ⊢ B
Table 2: Sequent calculus MILL
Since in a sequent Γ ⊢ A we identify Γ to a multiset of formulas, the exchange
rule—the reshuffling of Γ—is implicit.
A sequent Γ ⊢ A where Γ = A1, . . . , An is valid in a modal Kripke resource
frame iff the formula A1 ⊗ . . .⊗An ⊸ A is valid, namely |= Γ∗⊸ A.
We obtain the sequent calculus for our minimal modal logic MILL by ex-
tending the language of ILL with modal formulas and by adding a new rule.
Saturating the notation, we label the sequent calculus rule like the rule for
equivalents in the Hilbert system: (re). The calculus is shown in Table 2.
To establish a link with the previous section, we first show that provability
in sequent calculus is equivalent to provability in the Hilbert system.
Theorem 5. It holds that Γ ⊢H-MILL A iff the sequent Γ ⊢ A is derivable in the
sequent calculus for MILL.
Proof. (Sketch) The propositional cases are proved in [3], we only need to extend
it for the case of the modal rules. This is done by induction on the length of the
proof. For instance, in one direction, assume that a derivation D of ⊢H A⊸
B is obtained by D′ of ⊢H A ⊸ B and D′′ of ⊢H B ⊸ A. By definition
of deduction and of ⊢H-MILL, we have that A ⊢H-MILL B and B ⊢H-MILL A. By
induction hypothesis, we have that A ⊢ B and B ⊢ A are provable in the sequent
calculus. Thus, by (re) and ⊸ R, we have that ⊢ A ⊸ B is provable in
the sequent calculus.
Crucially, the modal extension does not affect cut elimination. Cut elimi-
nation holds for Linear Logic [17]. The proof for MILL largely adapts the proof
for Linear Logic [45]. Recall that the rank of a cut is the complexity of the cut
formula. The cutrank of a proof is the maximum of the ranks of the cuts in
the proof. The level of a cut is the length of the subproof ending in the cut,
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[45]. The proof of cut elimination proceeds by induction on the cutrank of the
proof. It is enough to assume that the occurrence of the cut with maximal rank
is the last rule of the proof. The inductive step shows how to replace a proof
ending in a cut with rank n with a proof with the same conclusion and smaller
cutrank. The proof of the inductive step proceeds by induction on the level of
the terminal cut, namely on the length of the proof. Note that if one of the
premises of a cut is an axiom, then we can simply eliminate the cut. Given a
sequent rule R, the occurrence of a formula A in the conclusion of R is principal
if A has been introduced by R.
Theorem 6. Cut elimination holds for MILL.
Proof. (Sketch) As usual, there are two main cases to consider: first, the cut
formula is principal in both premises of the terminal cut rule, and second, that
is not the case.
First main case. We replace the cut of maximal rank with two cuts with strictly
smaller rank. For example, take the case in which C is the cut formula and
is principal in both premises (i.e. it has been introduced by (re)):
B ⊢ C C ⊢ B
(re)
B ⊢ C
C ⊢ D D ⊢ C
(re)
C ⊢ D
cut
B ⊢ D
It is reduced by replacing the cut on C by two cuts on C with strictly smaller
rank.
B ⊢ C C ⊢ D
cut
B ⊢ D
D ⊢ C C ⊢ B
cut
D ⊢ B
(re)
B ⊢ D
Second main case. The cut formula is not principal in one of the premises of
the cut rule. Suppose R is the rule that does not introduce the cut formula. In
this case, we can apply the cut after R. By induction, the proof minus R can
be turned into a cut-free proof, since the length of the subproof is smaller and
the cutrank is equal or smaller. By applying again R to the cut-free proof, we
obtain a proof with the same conclusion of the starting proof and less cuts.
For example,
B ⊢ C C ⊢ B
(re)
B ⊢ C
...
R
Γ,C ⊢ A
cut
B,Γ ⊢ A
can be turned into:
B ⊢ C C ⊢ B
(re)
B ⊢ C
...
Γ′,C ⊢ A′
cut
B,Γ′ ⊢ A′ Γ′′ ⊢ A′′
R
B,Γ ⊢ A
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By inspecting the rules others than cut, it is easy to see that cut elimination
entails the subformula property, namely if Γ ⊢ A is derivable, then there is a
derivation containing subformulas of Γ and A only.
The decidability remains to be established. We can show that the proof-
search for MILL is no more costly in terms of space than the proof-search for
propositional intuitionistic multiplicative additive L.inear Logic [29].
Theorem 7. Proof search complexity for MILL is in PSPACE.
Proof. (Sketch) The proof adapts the argument in [29]. By cut elimination,
Theorem 6, for every provable sequent inMILL there is a cut-free proof with same
conclusion. For every rule in MILL other than (cut), the premises have a strictly
lower complexity wrt. the conclusion. Hence, for every provable sequent, there
is a proof whose branches have a depth at most linear in the size of the sequent.
The size of a branch is at most quadratic in the size of the conclusion. And it
contains only subformulas of the conclusion sequent because of the subformula
property. This means that one can non-deterministically guess such a proof,
and check each branch one by one using only a polynomial space. Proof search
is then in NPSPACE = PSPACE.
We present the proof of completeness of MILL wrt. the class of modal Kripke
resource frames.
Theorem 8 (Completeness of the sequent calculus). If |= Γ∗⊸ A then Γ ⊢ A.
The proof can be summarised as follow. We build a canonical modelMc (Def-
inition 3). In particular, the setM c of states consists in the set of finite multisets
of formulas, and the neutral element ec is the empty multiset. We first need to
show that it is indeed a modal Kripke resource model (Lemma 9). Second we
need to show a correspondence, the “Truth Lemma”, between ⊢ and truth in
Mc. Precisely we show that for a formula A and a multiset of formulas Γ ∈M c,
it is the case that Γ satisfies A iff Γ ⊢ A is provable in the calculus (Lemma 10).
Finally, to show completeness, assume that it is not the case that ⊢ Γ∗⊸ A. By
the Truth Lemma, it means that in the canonical model Γ∗⊸ A is not satisfied
at ec. So Mc does not satisfy Γ∗⊸ A. So it is not the case that |= Γ∗⊸ A.
We construct the canonical model Mc, then we prove that Mc is a modal
Kripke resource model, and we prove the Truth Lemma.
In the following, ⊔ is the multiset union. Also, | A |c= {Γ | Γ ⊢ A}.
Definition 3. Let Mc = (M c, ec, ◦c,≥c, N c, V c) such that:
• M c = {Γ | Γ is a finite multiset of formulas};
• Γ ◦c ∆ = Γ ⊔∆;
• ec = ∅;
• Γ ≥c ∆ iff Γ ⊢ ∆∗;
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• Γ ∈ V c(p) iff Γ ⊢ p;
• N c(Γ) = {| A |c| Γ ⊢ A}.
Lemma 9. Mc is a modal Kripke resource model.
Proof. 1. (M c, ec, ◦c,≥c) is the “right type” of ordered monoid: (i) (M c, ec, ◦c)
is a commutative monoid with neutral element ec, and (ii) ≥c is a pre-order on
M c. Finally, (iii) if Γ ≥c ∆ and Γ′ ≥c ∆′ then Γ ◦c Γ′ ≥c ∆ ◦c ∆′.
For (i), commutativity (and associativity) follow from the definition of ◦c
as the multiset union, and the neutrality of ec follows from it being the empty
multiset—the neutral element of the multiset union.
For (ii), ≥c is reflexive because {A1, . . . , An} ⊢ {A1, . . . , An}∗ can be proved
from the axioms (ax) Ak ⊢ Ak, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and by applying ⊗R n − 1 times.
The key rule to establish that ≥c is transitive is cut.
For (iii), assume Γ ≥c ∆ and Γ′ ≥c ∆′, that is, Γ ⊢ ∆∗ and Γ′ ⊢ ∆′∗. By
⊗R we have Γ,Γ′ ⊢ ∆∗ ⊗ ∆′∗. By applying the definitions we end up with
Γ ⊔ Γ′ ⊢ (∆ ⊔∆′)∗ and the expected result follows.
2. V c is a valuation function and satisfies heredity: if Γ ∈ V (p) and ∆ ≥c Γ
then ∆ ∈ V (p). To see this, suppose Γ ⊢ p and ∆ ⊢ Γ∗. By applying ⊗L enough
times, we have Γ∗ ⊢ p. By cut, we obtain ∆ ⊢ p.
3. N c is well-defined: Suppose that | A |c=| B |c. We need to show that
| A |c∈ N c(Γ) iff | B |c∈ N c(Γ).
From | A |c=| B |c, we have Γ ⊢ A ⇒ Γ ⊢ B. In particular, we have
A ⊢ A⇒ A ⊢ B. Hence, A ⊢ B is provable (by rule (ax)). We show symmetri-
cally that B ⊢ A is provable.
From A ⊢ B and B ⊢ A, we have by rule (re) that A ⊢ B is provable,
and also that B ⊢ A is provable.
Now suppose that Γ ⊢ A. Since A ⊢ B is provable, we obtain by cut
that Γ ⊢ B is provable. Symmetrically, suppose that Γ ⊢ B. Since B ⊢ A
is provable, we obtain by cut that Γ ⊢ A is provable.
Hence, we have that Γ ⊢ A iff Γ ⊢ B. By definition of N c, it means that
| A |c∈ N c(Γ) iff | B |c∈ N c(Γ).
4. If X ∈ N c(Γ) and ∆ ≥c Γ then X ∈ N c(∆). To see that this is the case,
the hypotheses are equivalent to Γ ⊢ A for some A such that | A |c= X , and
∆ ⊢ Γ∗. By repeatedly applying ⊗L to obtain Γ∗ ⊢ A and by using cut, we
infer that ∆ ⊢ A. Which is equivalent to the statement that X ∈ N c(∆).
Let us then denote by |=c the truth relation in Mc.
Lemma 10. Γ |=c A iff Γ ⊢ A.
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Proof. By structural induction on the form of A. For the base case, we have
for every atom p that Γ |=c p iff Γ ∈ V c(p) iff Γ ⊢ p. For induction, we suppose
that the lemma holds for a formula B (Induction Hypothesis). The cases of the
propositional connectives are found in [22]. We prove here the case A = B.
We have the following sequence of equivalences of Γ |=c B:
iff || B ||M
c
∈ N c(Γ), by definition of |=c;
iff {∆ | ∆ |=c B} ∈ N c(Γ), by definition of || . ||M
c
;
iff {∆ | ∆ ⊢ B} ∈ N c(Γ), by Induction Hypothesis;
iff | B |c∈ N c(Γ), by definition of | . |c;
iff Γ ⊢ B, by definition of N c.
We could now prove that the sequent calculus is sound, and we could adapt
our proof of Theorem 8 to prove that the Hilbert system H-MILL is complete.
But we are already there; We have the following:
• if Γ ⊢H-MILL A then e |= Γ∗ ⊸ A (Theorem 4);
• if e |= Γ∗⊸ A then Γ ⊢ A (Theorem 8);
• if Γ ⊢ A then Γ ⊢H-MILL A (Theorem 5).
Therefore, the completeness of the Hilbert system and the soundness of the
sequent calculus both follow.
Corollary 11. We have:
• if e |= Γ∗ ⊸ A then Γ ⊢H-MILL A;
• if Γ ⊢ A then e |= Γ∗⊸ A.
5 Adding non-commutativity
Systems that integrate a commutative Linear Logic with a non-commutative
one have been studied in [14, 1, 43]. Note that the purely non-commutative
version of intuitionistic Linear Logic is basically the calculus with two order
sensitive implications developed by Lambek [28]. The basic propositional logic
that we use is provided by [14] and labelled PCL, partially commutative Linear
Logic. The main novelty is that the structural rule of exchange no longer holds
in general. The context of a sequent is now only partially commutative, and
is now built by means of two constructors. Thus, we essentially use context as
a shorthand for partially commutative context. Every formula (to be defined
shortly after) is a context. Then, for every context Γ and ∆, we can build their
parallel composition (Γ,∆) (primarily commutative context) and their serial
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composition (Γ;∆) (primarily non-commutative context) [4]. A context can
thus be seen as finite tree with non-leaf nodes labelled with ‘;’ or ‘,’ and with
leafs labelled by formulas. Two branches emanating from a ‘,’ commute with
each other, while the branches emanating from a ‘;’ node do not. We write ()
for the empty context, and assume that it acts as the identity element of the
parallel and serial composition, that is: ((),Γ) = (Γ, ()) = ((); Γ) = (Γ; ()) = Γ.
We denote by Γ[−] a context “with a hole”, and Γ[∆] denotes this very context
with the “hole filled” with the context ∆.
The language of PCMILL extends the language of MILL by adding the follow-
ing operators: the non-commutative tensor noted ⊙ and the two order sensitive
implications noted \ and /:
A ::= 1 | p | A⊗A | A&A | A⊸ A | A⊙A | A \A | A/A | A
where p ∈ Atom.
In order to blend together commutative and non-commutative sequence,
we have to choose what is the interpretation of commutativity, namely if we
view a commutative concurrent process such as A ⊗ B as entailing that either
directions are allowed [14, 4]. That is, parallel composition is weaker than serial
composition, so it shall hold that A ⊗ B ⊸ A ⊙ B. This means that if two
resources can be combined with no particular order, then they can be combined
sequentially. This choice is reflected by the structural rule of entropy (ent)
below. The first two lines of Table 3 state the associativity of serial and parallel
compositions, the third line states the commutativity of parallel composition and
the entropy principle. The meaning of the two implications can be expressed in
terms of pre-conditions and post-conditions. A\B requires that A occurs before
(i.e. on the left of) the implication: A;A \ B ⊢ B. By contrast, B/A requires
that A occurs after the implication, accordingly: B/A;A ⊢ B.
Semantics and completeness. In order to define a class of modal Kripke
resource models for PCMILL, we extend the models we have considered in Sec-
tion 2. We add to a modal Kripke resource model (M, e, ◦,≥, N, V ) an asso-
ciative, non-commutative operation • such that e is neutral also for •. Thus,
a Kripke resource model is now specified by M = (M, e, ◦, •,≥, N, V ). Bifunc-
toriality is assumed also for •: if m ≥ n, and m′ ≥ n′, then m •m′ ≥ n • n′.
Moreover, the entropy principle is captured in the models by means of the fol-
lowing constraint: for all x, y, x ◦ y ≥ x • y. If M satisfies all these conditions,
we call it a partially commutative modal Kripke resource model.
The new truth conditions are the following:
m |=M A⊙B iff there exist m1 and m2 such that m ≥ m1 •m2 and m1 |=M A
and m2 |=M B.
m |=M A \B iff for all n ∈M , if n |=M A, then n •m |=M B.
m |=M B/A iff for all n ∈M , if n |=M A, then m • n |=M B.
Note that, if m |= A ⊗ B, then by m1 ◦m2 ≥ m1 •m2 and heredity, we have
that m |= A⊙B.
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Structural rules
Γ[∆1, (∆2,∆3)] ⊢ A
,a1
Γ[(∆1,∆2),∆3)] ⊢ A
Γ[(∆1,∆2),∆3)] ⊢ A
,a2
Γ[∆1, (∆2,∆3)] ⊢ A
Γ[∆1; (∆2; ∆3)] ⊢ A
;a1
Γ[(∆1; ∆2);∆3)] ⊢ A
Γ[(∆1; ∆2);∆3)] ⊢ A
;a2
Γ[∆1; (∆2; ∆3)] ⊢ A
Γ[∆1,∆2] ⊢ A ,com
Γ[∆2,∆1] ⊢ A
Γ[∆1; ∆2] ⊢ A
ent
Γ[∆1,∆2] ⊢ A
Non-commutative connectives
Γ[A;B] ⊢ C
⊙L
Γ[A⊙B] ⊢ C
Γ ⊢ A Γ′ ⊢ B
⊙R
Γ; Γ′ ⊢ A⊙B
Γ ⊢ A ∆[B] ⊢ C
\ L
∆[Γ;A \B] ⊢ C
A; Γ ⊢ B
\R
Γ ⊢ A \B
Γ ⊢ A ∆[B] ⊢ C
/ L
∆[B/A; Γ] ⊢ C
Γ;A ⊢ B
/R
Γ ⊢ A/B
Table 3: PCMILL: extending the sequent calculus MILL
We shall prove soundness and completeness of PCMILL. We start by dis-
cussing the partially commutative version of MILL. Soundness of PCMILL wrt.
the semantics above is just an extension of the induction for the soundness of
MILL with the new rules for non-commutative connective. For completeness, we
need to extend the construction of the canonical model in order to account for
the non-commutative structure.
As before, a context can be associated to a unique formula by means of a
recursive operation, here .+. We adopt the following definition:
()+ = 1
(A)+ = A
(Γ,∆)+ = (Γ+ ⊗∆+)
(Γ;∆)+ = (Γ+ ⊙∆+)
Let Mc• = (M
c, ec, ◦c, •c,≥c, N c, V c) such that: M c = {Γ | Γ is a partially
commutative context}; ec = (); Γ ◦c ∆ = (Γ,∆); Γ •c ∆ = (Γ;∆); Γ ≥c ∆ iff
Γ ⊢ ∆+; Γ ∈ V c(p) iff Γ ⊢ p; N c(Γ) = {| A |c| Γ ⊢ A}.
We will show that Mc• is actually a partially commutative modal Kripke
resource model. It suffices to adapt and extend the proof of Lemma 9. Important
bits are:
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1. ec is neutral for •c;
2. associativity of •c;
3. for all Γ,∆ ∈M c: Γ ◦c ∆ ≥c Γ •c ∆;
4. Γ ≥c ∆ and Γ′ ≥c ∆′ then Γ •c Γ′ ≥c ∆ •c ∆′;
5. If X ∈ N c(Γ) and Γ ≥c ∆ then X ∈ N c(∆).
We sketch the arguments here. Item 1 and item 2 follow from the definition
of partially commutative contexts. We look at the case of entropy (item 3)
with more attention. By repeated use of (ax), ⊗R, and ⊙R, we can show
(Γ;∆) ⊢ (Γ;∆)+. By (ent), we obtain (Γ,∆) ⊢ (Γ;∆)+, and apply the definition
of ≥c to have (Γ,∆) ≥c (Γ;∆)+. By definition of ◦c we have (Γ◦c∆) ≥c (Γ;∆)+.
Call In the latter inequality. Now, by (ax), we have (Γ;∆)+ ⊢ (Γ;∆)+, which
by definition of ≥c is equivalent to (Γ;∆)+ ≥c (Γ;∆). By definition of •c, we
have (Γ;∆)+ ≥c (Γ •c ∆). Together with In, we have (Γ ◦c ∆) ≥c (Γ •c ∆).
To start with item 4, assume Γ ≥c ∆ and Γ′ ≥c ∆′, that is by definition
of ≥c, Γ ⊢ ∆+ and Γ′ ⊢ ∆′+. By ⊙R, we have (Γ; Γ′) ⊢ ∆+ ⊙ ∆′+. By
the definition of .+, it means that (Γ; Γ′) ⊢ (∆;∆′)+. Again by definition of
≥c, we have (Γ; Γ′) ≥c (∆;∆′). Finally by definition of •c we conclude that
(Γ •c Γ′) ≥c (∆ •c ∆′).
Item 5 is almost identical to the same case in the proof of Lemma 9, but
we explicitly adapt it here. The hypotheses are equivalent to Γ ⊢ A for some
A such that | A |c= X , and ∆ ⊢ Γ+. By repeatedly applying ⊗L and ⊙L to
obtain Γ+ ⊢ A and by using cut, we infer that ∆ ⊢ A. Which is equivalent
to the statement that X ∈ N c(∆).
The truth lemma can be checked by routine induction. Thus we can con-
clude.
Theorem 12. PCMILL is sound and complete wrt. the class of partially com-
mutative modal Kripke resource models.
6 Resource-sensitive “bringing-it-about”
We present the (non-normal modal) logic of agency of bringing-it-about [15, 19],
and propose two versions of it in Linear Logic coined RSBIAT (for Resource-
Sensitive “bringing-it-about”) and SRSBIAT (for Resource-Sensitive “bringing-
it-about” with sequences of actions). RSBIAT and SRSBIAT are respectively
extensions of MILL and of PCMILL. In Section 7, we will illustrate the logic by
representing a few actions of agents, functions of artefacts, and their interac-
tions.
We specialise the minimal modality studied in the previous sections to a
modality agency. In fact, for each agent a in a set A, we define a modality Ea,
and EaA specifies that agent a ∈ A brings about A. As previously, to interpret
them in a modal Kripke resource frame, we take one neighbourhood function
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Na for each agent a that obeys Condition (1) in Definition 1. We havem |= EaA
iff ||A|| ∈ Na(m).
6.1 Bringing-it-about in classical logic
The four following principles typically constitute the core of logics of agency [40,
15, 5]:
1. If something is brought about, then this something holds.
2. It is not possible to bring about a tautology.
3. If an agent brings about two things concomitantly then the agent also
brings about the conjunction of these two things.
4. If two statements are equivalent, then bringing about one is equivalent to
bringing about the other.
Briefly, we explain how these principles are captured in classical logic. Item 1 is
a principle of success. It corresponds to the axiom T: EiA→ A. Item 2 has been
open to some debate, although Chellas is essentially the only antagonist. (See [9]
and [11].) It corresponds to the axiom ¬Ei⊤ (notaut). Item 3 corresponds to the
axiom: EiA∧EiB → Ei(A∧B). That is, if i is doing A while also doing B, then
we can deduce that i is doing A ∧ B. The other way round needs not be true.
Item 4 confers to the concept of bringing about the quality of being a modality,
effectively obeying the rule of equivalents: if ⊢ A↔ B then ⊢ EiA↔ EiB.
6.2 Resource-sensitive BIAT
We now detail the logic of RSBIAT. We capture the four principles, adapted
to the resource-sensitive framework, by means of rules in the sequent calculus,
cf. Table 5
The principle of item 1 is captured by Ea(refl) that entails the linear version
of T: EaA ⊸ A. In our interpretation, it means that if an agent brings about
A, then A affects the environment.
Because of the difference between the unities in Linear Logic and in classical
logic, the principle of item 2 requires some attention. In classical logic all
tautologies are provably equivalent to the unity ⊤. Say A is theorem (⊢ A), we
have ⊢ A↔ ⊤. Hence, from the rule of equivalents, and the axiom ⊢ ¬Ea⊤ that
indicates than no agent brings about the tautological constant, one can deduce
⊢ ¬EaA whenever the formula A is a theorem. In Linear Logic, the unity 1 is not
provably equivalent to all theorems. Thus, the axiom of BIAT must be changed
into an inference rule (∼ nec) in RSBIAT: if ⊢ A, then EaA ⊢ ⊥. It is effectively
a sort of “anti-necessitation rule”. So, if a formula is a theorem, if an agent
brings it about, then the contradiction is entailed. This amounts to negating
EaA, according to intuitionistic negation, for every tautological formula A.
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The principle of BIAT for combining actions (item 3 in the list) is open to
two interpretations here: a multiplicative one and an additive one. The additive
combination means that if there is a choice for agent a between bringing about
A and bringing about B, then agent a can bring about a choice between A and
B. Ea⊗ means that if an agent a brings about action A and brings about action
B then a brings about both actions A⊗ B. Moreover, in order to bring about
A⊗B, the sum of the resources for A and the resources for B is required.
Finally, the logics of the minimal modality already satisfy the rule of equiv-
alents for Ea: from A ⊢ B and B ⊢ A we infer EaA ⊢ EaB. This is inherited by
RSBIAT, and it is all that is needed to capture the principle of item 4.
We enrich H-MILL, the Hilbert system for MILL, as follows and we label this
system H-RSBIAT. We add the following axioms.
all axioms of H-MILL
EaA⊸ A
EaA⊗ EaB⊸ Ea(A⊗B)
EaA& EaB⊸ Ea(A&B)
Table 4: Axiom schemata in H-RSBIAT
The definition of deduction in H-RSBIAT extends the definition of deduction
in H-MILL (Definition 2) with the following possible rule to consider for the
inductive steps.
D
⊢H A (∼ nec)
⊢H EaA⊸ ⊥
On the side of the semantics, we propose the following conditions on modal
Kripke resource frames (M, e, ◦,≥, {Na}, V ). The rule (∼ nec) requires:
if (X ∈ Na(w)) and (e ∈ X) then (w ∈ V (⊥)) (2)
The rule (Ea(refl)) requires:
if X ∈ Na(w) then w ∈ X (3)
The condition corresponding to the multiplicative version of action combination
(Ea⊗) is the following, where X ◦ Y = {x ◦ y | x ∈ X and y ∈ Y }, and
X↑ = {y | y ≥ x and x ∈ X}:
if X ∈ Na(x) and Y ∈ Na(y) , then (X ◦ Y )
↑ ∈ Na(x ◦ y) (4)
The condition on the frames corresponding to the additive version is the follow-
ing:
if X ∈ Na(x) and Y ∈ Na(x), then X ∩ Y ∈ Na(x) (5)
Next, we introduce a sequent calculus for RSBIAT. The rules of RSBIAT for
E& show that in order to bring about the choice between A & B is enough to
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⊢ A ∼nec
EaA ⊢ ⊥
Γ ⊢ EaA Γ ⊢ EaB
Ea&
Γ ⊢ Ea(A&B)
Γ, A ⊢ B
Ea(refl)
Γ,EaA ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ EaA ∆ ⊢ EaB
Ea⊗
Γ,∆ ⊢ Ea(A⊗B)
Table 5: RSBIAT (extends MILL)
use the resources for one of the two. On the contrary, in order to bring about
A⊗B, the sum of the resources for A and the resources for B is required.
We can prove that H-RSBIAT and the sequent calculus for RSBIAT are equiv-
alent.
Proposition 13. It holds that Γ ⊢H-RSBIAT A iff Γ ⊢ A is derivable in RSBIAT.
Proof. (Sketch) The proof is again an induction on the length of derivations.
For example, in one direction, axiom EaA ⊗ EaB ⊸ Ea(A ⊗ B) is derivable in
the sequent calculus by simply applying ⊗L and⊸ R to EaA,EaB ⊢ Ea(A⊗B)
which has been obtained from axioms by means of Ea⊗.
We can now prove soundness and completeness of RSBIAT.
Theorem 14. RSBIAT is sound and complete wrt. the class of modal Kripke
frames that satisfy (2), (3), (4), and (5).
Proof. (Sketch) We just show two correspondences.
Condition (2) and rule (∼nec). (∼nec) is sound. Assume that for every
model, e |= A. We need to show that e |= EaA ⊸ ⊥. That is, for every x,
if x |= EaA, then x models ⊥. If x |= EaA, then by definition, ||A|| ∈ Na(x).
Since A is a theorem, e ∈ ||A||, thus by Condition 2, x ∈ V (⊥), so x |= ⊥. For
completeness, it suffices to adapt our canonical model construction. Build the
canonical model for RSBIAT as in Def. 3 (we have now more valid sequents).
Now suppose (1) X ∈ N ca(Γ), and (2) e
c ∈ X . By definition of N ca and of | . |
c,
there is A, s.t. | A |c= X , (1) Γ ⊢ EaA and (2) ⊢ A. From (2), and (∼nec):
EaA ⊢ ⊥. From (1), and previous, we obtain Γ ⊢ ⊥ using (cut). By definition
of V c, Γ ∈ V c(⊥).
Condition (4) and rule (Ea⊗). (Ea⊗) is sound. Assume e |= Γ∗⊸ EaA and
e |= ∆∗ ⊸ EaB. Then, for all x that make Γ true, ||A|| ∈ Na(x) and for all y
that make ∆ true, ||B|| ∈ Na(y). By (4), ||A|| ◦ ||B|| ∈ Na(x ◦ y), so for any
x ◦ y that make (Γ,∆)∗ true, x ◦ y |= Ea(A ⊗ B). For completeness, suppose
X ∈ N ca(Γ) and Y ∈ N
c
a(∆). By definition of N
c
a and of | . |
c, there is A and
B, with | A |c= X , and | B |c= Y , s.t. Γ ⊢ EaA, and ∆ ⊢ EaB. By (Ea⊗), we
obtain Γ,∆ ⊢ Ea(A⊗B) and thus | A⊗B |c∈ N ca(Γ ⊔∆) by definition of | . |
c.
The definition of ◦c gives us | A⊗B |c∈ N ca(Γ ◦
c ∆). By the Truth Lemma, we
have that ||A⊗B||M
c
∈ N ca(Γ ◦
c ∆). Thus (X ◦c Y )↑ ∈ N ca(Γ ◦
c ∆).
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Therefore, also our extensions of Hilbert systems and sequent calculus are
sound and complete wrt. the modal Kripke resource frames restricted to the
relevant conditions given in this section.
Corollary 15. H-RSBIAT is sound and complete wrt. the class of modal Kripke
frames that satisfy (2), (3), and (4).
Moreover, RSBIAT enjoys cut elimination.
Theorem 16. Cut elimination holds for RSBIAT.
Proof. (Sketch) We extend the proof of Theorem (6) by presenting a number of
new cases for the cut formula being principal in both premises of the cut rule.
The other cases can be treated similarly. The cut formula has been introduced
by Ea(re) and ∼nec
A ⊢ B B ⊢ A
Ea(re)
EaA ⊢ EaB
⊢ B ∼nec
EaB ⊢ ⊥
cut
EaA ⊢ ⊥
 
⊢ B B ⊢ A
cut
⊢ A ∼nec
EaA ⊢ ⊥
The cut formula has been introduced by Ea⊗ and Ea(refl).
Γ′ ⊢ A ...
Γ ⊢ EaA
∆′ ⊢ B ...
∆ ⊢ EaB
Γ,∆ ⊢ Ea(A⊗B)
Σ′, A ⊢ C′ Σ′′, B ⊢ C′′
Σ, A⊗B ⊢ C
Σ,Ea(A⊗B) ⊢ C
cut
Γ,∆,Σ ⊢ C
It can be reduced by pushing the cut upwards.
Γ′ ⊢ A Σ′, A ⊢ C′
cut
Γ′,Σ′ ⊢ C′
∆′ ⊢ B Σ′′, B ⊢ C′′
cut
∆′,Σ′′ ⊢ C′′ ...... ...
Γ,∆,Σ ⊢ C
Once again, it is easy to see that cut elimination entails the subformula
property for RSBIAT. Using the same arguments as for Theorem 7, it is clear
that we can decide polynomial space whether a sequent is valid in RSBIAT.
Theorem 17. Proof search complexity for RSBIAT is in PSPACE.
6.3 RSBIAT with sequences of actions
So far, we have discussed how to control weakening and contraction in order to
provide a resource sensitive account of agency. There is one important structural
rule that we did not discuss, namely the exchange rule. In this section, we extend
RSBIAT by introducing the non-commutative multiplicative conjunction ⊙, and
its two associated order-sensitive implications.
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The significance of this move goes beyond the technical aspect, which is
rather straightforward at that point. Indeed, a recurring point of contention
against the logics of bringing-it-about is the absence of a basic notion of time.
Non-commutative composition of formulas will provide to us an immediate and
natural way of talking, if not about time proper, at least about sequences of
actions. Reading A ⊙ B as “first A then B”, we will also read (EaA) ⊙ (EbB)
as “first a brings about A then b brings about B”.
We obtain SRSBIAT by adding the non-commutative versions of Ea⊗ and
rephrasing the commutative rules by means of the context notation. The rule
Ea(refl) can now operate both in commutative and non-commutative contexts.
Γ[A] ⊢ B
Ea(refl)
Γ[EaA] ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ EaA ∆ ⊢ EaB
Ea⊙
Γ;∆ ⊢ Ea(A⊙B)
Table 6: Resource “bringing-it-about” with sequences of actions (extends PCL
and H-RSBIAT)
Note that the presentation of ∼nec, Ea⊗, and Ea& is not affected by the
generalisation to partially commutative. Ea(refl) states that we can introduce
the modality also in non-commutative contexts. Ea⊙ adapts the principle of
composition of actions (cf. item 3, p. 17) to sequences; it states that we can
compose two ordered actions into one sequence of actions.
In order to offer a semantics to our extension of RSBIAT with sequences
of actions, we need to add a condition on the neighbourhood functions that
deals with the non-commutative operator. Specifically, we need the following
condition:
if X ∈ Na(x) and Y ∈ Na(y) , then (X • Y )
↑ ∈ Na(x • y) (6)
We obtain naturally the semantic determination.
Theorem 18. SRSBIAT is sound and complete wrt. the class of partially com-
mutative modal Kripke resource models that satisfy (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6).
7 Application: manipulation of artefacts
7.1 Artefacts
Our application lies in the reasoning about artefact’s function and tool use. By
endorsing what we may call an agential stance, we view artefacts as special
kind of agents. They are characterised by the fact that they are designed by
some other agent in order to achieve a purpose in a particular environment.
An important aspect of the modelling of artefacts is their interaction with the
environment and with the agents that use the artefact to achieve a specific
goal [16, 8, 21, 27]. Briefly, we can view an artefact as an object that in presence
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of a number of preconditions c1, . . . , cn produces the outcome o. In this work,
we want to represent the function of artefacts by means of logical formulas and
to view the correct behaviour of an artefact by means of a form of reasoning.
When reasoning about artefacts and their outcomes, we need to be careful in
making all the conditions of use of the artefact explicit, otherwise we end up
facing the following unintuitive cases. Imagine we represent the behaviour of a
screwdriver as a formula of classical logic that states that if there is a screw S,
then we can tighten it T . We simply describe the behaviour of the artefact as a
material implication S → T . In classical logic, we can infer that by means of a
single screwdriver we can tighten two screws: S, S, S → T ⊢ T ∧ T . Worse, we
do not even need to have two screws to begin with: S, S → T ⊢ T ∧ T . Thus,
without specifying all the relevant constraints on the environment (e.g., that
a screwdriver can handle one screw at the time) we end up with unintuitive
results. Another possible drawback of classical logic is that it is commutative,
the order of formulas does not matter. For example, if we describe the process
of hammering a nail by means of the implication if I place a nail N and I provide
the right force F , then I can drive a nail in (D), that is N ∧F → D, that would
entail also that one can put a force before placing the nail.
Moreover, we need to specify the relationship between the artefact and the
agents: for example, there are artefacts that can be used by one agent at the
time. Since a crucial point in modelling artefacts is their interaction with the
environment, either we carefully list all the relevant conditions, or we need to
change the logical framework that we use to represent the artefact’s behaviour.
In this paper, we propose to pursue this second strategy. Our motivation is that,
instead of specifying for each artefact the precondition of its application (e.g.,
that there is only one screw that a screw driver is supposed to operate on),
the logical language that encodes the behaviour of the artefact already takes
care of preventing unintuitive outcomes. Thus, the formulas of Linear Logic
shall represent actions of agents and functions of artefacts, and the non-normal
modality shall specify which agent or artefact brings about which process.
7.2 Functions
The concept of a function of an artefact aims to capture the description of the
behaviour of an artefact in an environment with respect to its goals: artefacts are
not living things but have a purpose, attributed by a designer or a user [8, 27].
We model a function of an artefact by means of a formula A in RSBIAT or
SRSBIAT. If A is a function of an artefact t, then one can represent t’s behaviour
as EtA (t brings about A) in a conceptually consistent manner, namely an
artefact brings about its function A.
With Linear Logic, we are equipped with a formalism to represent and reason
about processes and resources. In classical and intuitionistic logic, if one has A
and A implies B, then one has B, but A still holds. This is fine for mathematical
reasoning but often fails to be acceptable in the real world where implication is
causal. Girard remarks that “[a] causal implication cannot be iterated since the
conditions are modified after its use; this process of modification of the premises
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(conditions) is known in physics as reaction.” [18, p. 72] That is, Linear Logic
allows for modelling how the function of an artefact can be actually realised in
a certain environment. At an abstract level, an artefact can be seen as an agent
t. It takes resource-sensitive actions by reacting to the environment. For any
artefact t with function A, EtA, we say that t accomplishes a certain goal O in
the environment Γ if and only if the sequent Γ[EtA] ⊢ O is provable. The context
Γ describes a number of preconditions that specify the environment resources as
well as the actions of the agents that are interacting with the artefact. The proof
of Γ[EtA] ⊢ O exhibits the execution of the function of t in the environment Γ:
when t is an artefact, and Γ[EtA] ⊢ O is provable, then the occurrence of A in the
proof of Γ[EtA] ⊢ O is the concrete instantiation of the function of t in Γ. Since
we are using intuitionistic versions of Linear Logic, every proof of a sequent
is a process that behaves like a function in the mathematical sense.4 Hence,
the rules of sequent calculus provide instructions to compose basic functions
of artefacts to obtain complex functions and to model how the composition
interacts with the environment. We will see examples of complex functions in
the next paragraphs. For that reason, our view of artefacts simply generalises
to a number of artefacts that interact in an environment as follows:
Γ[E1A1, . . . ,EmAm] ⊢ O
Again, if the above sequent is provable, then the combination of artefacts
E1A1, ..., EmAm can achieve the goal O in Γ by executing their functions
A1, . . . , Am in Γ.
Defining the function of an artefact as a formula demands some care because
in this way functions do not have a unique formulation. The functions (A⊗B)⊸
C, and A⊸ (B⊸ C) are provably equivalent. However, the rule Ea(re) ensures
that bringing about a function is provably equivalent to bringing about any of
its equivalent forms.
By means of sequent calculus provability, we can view the problem of using
artefacts in an environment to achieve a goal as a decision problem that is
related to the AI problem of planning [26]. Note that the complexity of deciding
whether a goal is achievable depends only on the fragment of the logic that we
use to model the formulas in the sequent. In the next paragraphs, we shall
instantiate the descriptive features of our calculus by means of a number of toy
examples.
7.3 Simple examples of functions
Take a very simple example. We can represent the function of a screwdriver s
as an implication that states that if there is a screw (formula S) and some agent
brings about the right rotational force (F ), then the screw gets tighten (T ). The
formula corresponding to the function of the screwdriver is S ⊗ F ⊸ T . The
4This suggestion can be made mathematically precise. It is possible to associate terms in
the (linear) λ-calculus to proofs in intuitionistic Linear Logic [6].
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formula that captures the screwdriver as an agent of the system is Es(S ⊗F ⊸
T ).
Suppose the environment provides S and an agent i is providing the right
force EiF . We can show by means of the following proof in RSBIAT that the
goal T can be achieved.
S ⊢ S
F ⊢ F
Ei(refl)
EiF ⊢ F
⊗R
S,EiF ⊢ S ⊗ F T ⊢ T
⊸L
S,EiF, S ⊗ F ⊸ T ⊢ T
Es(refl)
S,EiF,Es(S ⊗ F ⊸ T ) ⊢ T
Our calculus is resource sensitive, thus, as expected, we cannot infer for example
that two agents can use the same screwdriver at the same time to tighten two
screws:
S, S,EiF,EjF,Es(S ⊗ F ⊸ T ) 6⊢ T ⊗ T
That would in fact require two screwdrivers and thus an extra Es(S ⊗ F ⊸ T )
at the left of the sequent. Often, to be effective for some goal B, an artefact’s
function transforming a resource A into a resource B should not be realised
before the resource A is available.
In the case of our example, the description of a screwdriver should exclude
that the screw can be tighten before a loose screw and a rotational force, in
this order, are provided. Thus, we may reconsider our screwdriver as a “non-
commutative” screwdriver s• and write its function as S⊙F \T . The screwdriver
is now defined as Es•(S ⊙ F \ T ).
S ⊢ S
F ⊢ F
Ei(refl)
EiF ⊢ F
⊙R
S;EiF ⊢ S ⊙ F T ⊢ T
\L
(S;EiF );S ⊙ F \ T ⊢ T
Es•(refl)
S;EiF ;Es•(S ⊙ F \ T ) ⊢ T
The meaning of entropy (ent) is the following. By means of (ent), we can
infer a fully commutative context:
S,EiF,Es•(S ⊙ F \ T ) ⊢ T
That means that it is the description of the function of the artefact that takes
care of of specifying how the resources have to be ordered. Of course, our screw-
driver formula correctly excludes, for instance, that the force is applied after us-
ing the screwdriver: S;Es•(S⊙F \T );EiF 6⊢ T Moreover, EiF ;Es•(S⊙F \T );S 6⊢
T , and EiF ;S;Es•(S ⊙ F \ T ) 6⊢ T .
The interaction of commutative and non-commutative operators is exempli-
fied as follows. Suppose there are two screws S, S, two screwdrivers s and s′
and two agents a, b. The goal of tightening two screws can be achieved by using
the screwdrivers in whatever order, as the following proof shows.
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S ⊢ S
F ⊢ F
Ei(refl)
EaF ⊢ F
⊙R
S;EaF ⊢ S ⊙ F T ⊢ T
\L
(S;EaF );S ⊙ F \ T ⊢ T
Es(refl)
S;EaF ;Es(S ⊙ F \ T ) ⊢ T
S ⊢ S
F ⊢ F
Eb(refl)
EbF ⊢ F
⊙R
S;EbF ⊢ S ⊙ F T ⊢ T
\L
(S;EbF );S ⊙ F \ T ⊢ T
Es′ (refl)
S;EbF ;Es′ (S ⊙ F \ T ) ⊢ T
⊗R
[S;EaF ;Es(S ⊙ F \ T )], [S;EbF ;Es′ (S ⊙ F \ T )] ⊢ T ⊗ T
7.4 Functions composition
By extending the previous example, we can demonstrate how the output of some
artefact’s function can naturally be fed into another function so as to construct
a new complex artefact.
An electric screwdriver has two components. Firstly, the power-pistol creates
some rotational force F when the button is pushed (P ): P \F . Secondly, what
is typically called the screwdriver bit is for all intents and purposes effectively a
screwdriver as specified before: it tightens a loose screw when a rotational force
is applied. We define the electric screwdriver by means of Ee((P \F )⊙(S⊙F \T ))
Now suppose the environment provides a loose screw S and an agent i is
pushing the button of the power pistol: EiP . We can show again that the goal
T of having a tighten screw can be achieved, by using the electric screwdriver.
S ⊢ S
P ⊢ P
Ei(refl)
EiP ⊢ P F ⊢ F \L
EiP ;P \ F ⊢ F
⊙R
S;EiP ;P \ F ⊢ S ⊙ F T ⊢ T
\L
S;EiP ;P \ F, S ⊙ F \ T ⊢ T
⊙L
S;EiP ; (P \ F )⊙ (S ⊙ F \ T ) ⊢ T
Ee(refl)
S;EiP ;Ee((P \ F )⊙ (S ⊙ F \ T )) ⊢ T
7.5 Complex interactions between agents and artefacts
The function of an artefact may require to specify how agents use it. A number
of aspects of the interaction between agents’ actions and artefacts can be cap-
tured by means of the rules Ei⊗, Ei⊙, and Ei&. Recall that A is a set of agents.
We write
˘
x∈A ExA as a short hand for Ei1A& · · ·& EimA. The latter formula
means that any agent can perform A, so for example Ei1A& · · ·&EimA ⊢ EijA.
An artefact that is defined by Et(
˘
x∈A(Ex(A⊗B)⊸ O)) requires the same
agent x to perform both actions A and B in order to get O. For example, a one
person rowboat that requires a single agent to operate on both oars (R1) and
(R2), in whatever order, so to produce movement (M). This is can be modelled
by means of our Ei⊗ rule.
25
EiR1 ⊢ EiR1 EiR2 ⊢ EiR2
Ei⊗
EiR1,EiR2 ⊢ Ei(R1 ⊗R2) M ⊢M
⊸L
EiR1,EiR2,Ei((R1 ⊗R2)⊸M) ⊢M
&L enough times
EiR1,EiR2,
˘
x∈A Ei((R1 ⊗R2)⊸M) ⊢M
Et(refl)
EiR1,EiR2,Et(
˘
x∈A Ei((R1 ⊗R2)⊸M)) ⊢M
On the other hand, by specifying the function by Et(
˘
x,y∈A,x 6=y(ExA ⊗
EyB)⊸ O), we are forcing the agents who operate tool t to be different (e.g., a
crosscut saw). If an artefact’s function does not determine whether the actions
must be performed by the same agent, we can write Et(
˘
x,y∈A(ExA⊗EyB)⊸
O).
In the non-commutative case, Et(
˘
x∈A Ex(A ⊙ B) ⊸ O) forces the same
agent to perform first A and then B, whereas Et(
˘
x,y∈A,x 6=y(ExA⊙EyB)⊸ O)
forces the agents to be different. For example, the function of a hanging ladder
is described as follows: firstly, an agent holds the laden (Ho), then another
agent climbs up (Cl) and reaches a certain position R: Et(EaHo⊙ EbCl \ EbR).
EaHo ⊢ EaHo EbCl ⊢ EbCl
⊙R
EaHo;EbCl ⊢ EaHo⊙ EbCl EbR ⊢ EbR
\L
EaHo;EbCl;EaHo⊙ EbCl \ EbR ⊢ EbR
Et(refl)
EaHo;EbCl;Et(EaHo⊙ EbCl \ EbR) ⊢ EbR
By means of Ei&, we can describe a function that requires an agent’s choice.
For example, a monkey wrench can tighten two sizes of nuts/bolts (N1, N2)
provided that an agent chooses the right measure (M1,M2): Et((Ei(M1&M2)⊸
EiN1) & (Ei(M1 & N2) ⊸ EiN2)). The following proof shows that if a single
agent can choose the right measure for the nut (e.g., M1), then the same agent
can tighten the right type of nut (e.g., EiN1)
EiM1 ⊢ EiM1
&L
EiM1 & EiM2 ⊢ EiM1
EiM2 ⊢ EiM2
&R
EiM1 & EiM2 ⊢ EiM2
Ei&
EiM1 & EiM2 ⊢ Ei(M1 &M2) EiN1 ⊢ EiN1
⊸L
EiM1 & EiM2,Ei(M1 &M2)⊸ EiN1 ⊢ EiN1
&L
EiM1 & EiM2, (Ei(M1 &M2)⊸ EiN1) & (Ei(M1 &M2)⊸ EiN2) ⊢ EiN1
Et(refl)
EiM1 & EiM2,Et((Ei(M1 &M2)⊸ EiN1) & (Ei(M1 &M2)⊸ EiN2)) ⊢ EiN1
In a similar way, we can represent functions of artefacts that require any
number of actions and of agents to achieve a goal (of course, if we want to express
that any subsets of A can operate the tool, then we need an exponentially long
formula).
7.6 Function warranty and reuse of artefacts
RSBIAT is resource-sensitive as the non-provable sequent in our screwdriver
example illustrated (Sec. 7.3)
S, S,EiF,EjF,Es(S ⊗ F ⊸ T ) 6⊢ T ⊗ T
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The screwdriver cannot be reused, despite the fact that an additional screw is
available and an appropriate force is brought about. This is perfectly fine as
long as our interpretation of resource consumption is concurrent : all resources
are consumed at once. And indeed, one cannot tighten two screws at once with
only one screwdriver.
Abandoning a concurrent interpretation of resource consumption, we may
specialise the modality Ea when a is an artefactual agent in such a way that the
function of an artefact can be used at will. After all, using a screwdriver once
does not destroy the screwdriver. Its function is still present after. It seems
that we are after a property of contraction for our operator Es.
Γ,EsA,EsA ⊢ B
c(Es)
Γ,EsA ⊢ B
Now, if we adopt the rule, c(Es) we can easily see that indeed
S, S,EiF,EjF,Es(S ⊗ F ⊸ T ) ⊢ T ⊗ T
is provable.
There are several issues with this solution to ‘reuse’ as a duplication of
assumptions. Some technical, some conceptual. The main technical issue is
that we lose a lot of control on the proof search, as contraction is the main
source of non-termination (of bottom-up proof search). Another technical (or
theoretical) issue is that trying to give a natural condition on our frames that
would be canonical for contraction is out of question. The conceptual issue
is the same as the one posed by Girard in creating Linear Logic: duplication
of assumptions should not be automatic. Similarly, ad lib reuse of an artefact
does not reflect a commonsensical experience. In general, although they don’t
consume after the first use, tools will nonetheless eventually become so worn
out that they will not realise their original function. The point is that, in order
to keep track of the relevant resources, the reuse of artefacts should not be
arbitrary and should be allowed in a controlled manner instead.
We can capitalise on the ‘additive’ feature of Linear Logic language: employ-
ing the ‘with’ operator &, we can specify a sort of warranty of artefact functions.
Denote An = A⊙ · · · ⊙A, for n times. We present the treatment by focusing
on our example of screwdriver. A sequentially reusable screwdriver is defined
as follows:
(S ⊙ F \ T )≤n = (S ⊙ F \ T ) & (S2 ⊙ F 2 \ T 2) & · · ·& (Sn ⊙ Fn \ T n)
For example, with three screws, and three agents (a, b, and c) providing
the appropriate force, then using a decently robust screwdriver, one can obtain
three tighten screws. We have:
S;S;S;EaF ;EbF ;EcF ;Es•((S ⊙ F \ T )
≤10000
) ⊢ T ⊙ T ⊙ T
where s• is our “non-commutative” screwdriver, now with a ten thousand-use
warranty.
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S ⊢ S S ⊢ S
S;S ⊢ S ⊙ S S ⊢ S
S;S;S ⊢ S ⊙ S ⊙ S
EaF ⊢ F EbF ⊢ F
EaF ;EbF ⊢ EaF ⊙ EbF EcF ⊢ F
EaF ;EbF ;EcF ⊢ F ⊙ F ⊙ F
S;S;S;EaF ;EbF ;EcF ⊢ S ⊙ S ⊙ S ⊙ F ⊙ F ⊙ F T
3 ⊢ T 3
S;S;S;EaF ;EbF ;EcF ;S
3 ⊙ F 3 \ T 3 ⊢ T 3
&L
S;S;S;EaF ;EbF ;EcF ; (S ⊙ F \ T )
≤10000 ⊢ T 3
Es(re)
S;S;S;EaF ;EbF ;EcF ;Es((S ⊙ F \ T )
≤10000) ⊢ T 3
Note that, the goal T ⊗ T ⊗ T is not provable, and this reflects our view of
reusability as a sequential operation.
By pushing this analogy of warranty of artefact functions further on, we can
model a “refurbishing” function that augments the warranty of the function A
of a tool t. For instance, consider the refurbishing function which at the cost of
consuming a resource R, transforms a worn out (but not too much worn out!)
screwdriver t into a screwdriver t with a function with extended warranty. It
can be written as:
R⊗ Es((S ⊙ F \ T )
≤50
)⊸ Es((S ⊙ F \ T )
≤7000
)
and is for example a function that a bench grinder would have.
8 Conclusion
The semantics of all the languages studied in this paper are adequate extensions
of Urquhart’s Kripke resource models for intuitionistic substructural logic. We
first enriched the Kripke resource models with a neighbourhood function to give
a meaning to a minimal (non-normal) modality. We obtained what we simply
coin modal Kripke resource models. We thus defined and studied a minimal
non-normal modal logic. The non-normal minimal modality  is defined in the
usual way where A holds at a point of evaluation iff the extension of A is in
the neighbourhood of the point of evaluation. With Condition 1 on the models
we enforced a sort of heredity (or monotonicity) on the neighbourhood function,
without which the logic would not even validate modus ponens.
We introduced a Hilbert system and a sequent calculus. We showed that
both are sound and complete with respect to the class of modal Kripke resource
models. Moreover, we showed that the sequent calculus admits cut elimination.
We used this fact to establish that proof search can be done in PSPACE. The
soundness and completeness of the sequent calculus, and the cut elimination
show that the rule (re)
A ⊢ B B ⊢ A
A ⊢ B
which is atypical in a sequent calculus, yields the expected results and presents
no logical issue. Moreover, the new semantics and calculi are general enough to
extend the framework, as we did, to account for partially commutative Linear
Logic.
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The significance of non-normal modal logics and their semantics in modern
developments in logics of agents has been emphasised before in the literature.
In classical logic, logics of agency in particular, have been widely studied and
used in practical philosophy and in multi-agent systems. Moving from classical
logic to resource-sensitive logics allows to lift the study of agents bringing about
states of affairs to the study of agents bringing about resources, or of artefacts
bringing about resource transformations.
We thus instantiated the minimal modal logics (commutative / and partially
commutative) with a resource-sensitive version of the logics of bringing-it-about.
Again, sound and complete Hilbert system and sequent calculus are provided.
Proof-search in the commutative version is shown to be PSPACE-easy. We
finally presented a number of applications of the resulting resource-conscious
logics of agency to reason about the resource-sensitive manipulations of technical
artefacts.
The perspectives for future research are extensions of our treatment to fur-
ther non-normal modalities for logics of BDI agents. For instance, introducing
resource-sensitive operators of beliefs will enable us to model agents’ beliefs
that depend on the amount of available information. Moreover, we are particu-
larly interested in a resource-sensitive view of the strategic power of agents and
coalitions, where the social interactions are mediated by the available resources.
References
[1] Vito Michele Abrusci and Paul Ruet. Non-commutative logic i: The multi-
plicative fragment. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 101(1):29–64, 1999.
[2] Horacio L. Arlo´-Costa and Eric Pacuit. First-order classical modal logic.
Studia Logica, 84(2):171–210, 2006.
[3] Arnon Avron. The semantics and proof theory of linear logic. Theor.
Comput. Sci., 57:161–184, 1988.
[4] Denis Be´chet, Philippe de Groote, and Christian Retore´. A complete ax-
iomatisation for the inclusion of series-parallel partial orders. In Rewriting
Techniques and Applications, 8th International Conference, RTA-97, Sit-
ges, Spain, June 2-5, 1997, Proceedings, pages 230–240, 1997.
[5] Nuel Belnap, Michael Perloff, and Ming Xu. Facing the Future (Agents and
Choices in Our Indeterminist World). Oxford University Press, 2001.
[6] Nick Benton, Gavin Bierman, Valeria De Paiva, and Martin Hyland. A
term calculus for intuitionistic linear logic. In Typed Lambda Calculi and
Applications, pages 75–90. Springer, 1993.
[7] Stefano Borgo, Daniele Porello, and Nicolas Troquard. Logical operators
for ontological modeling. In Formal Ontology in Information Systems -
Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference, FOIS 2014, September,
22-25, 2014, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, pages 23–36, 2014.
29
[8] Stefano Borgo and Laure Vieu. Artefacts in formal ontology. In Handbook
of Philosophy of Technology and Engineering Sciences, pages 273–308. El-
sevier, 2009.
[9] Brian Chellas. The Logical Form of Imperatives. Perry Lane Press, 1969.
[10] Brian Chellas. Modal Logic: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press,
1980.
[11] Brian Chellas. Time and modality in the logic of agency. Studia Logica,
51(3-4):485–517, 1992.
[12] Jean-Rene´ Courtault and Didier Galmiche. A Modal BI Logic for Dynamic
Resource Properties. In Sergei Artemov and Anil Nerode, editors, Log-
ical Foundations of Computer Science, volume 7734 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 134–148. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013.
[13] Marcello D’Agostino, Dov M. Gabbay, and Alessandra Russo. Grafting
modalities onto substructural implication systems. Studia Logica, 59(1):65–
102, 1997.
[14] Philippe De Groote. Partially commutative linear logic: sequent calcu-
lus and phase semantics. In Third Roma Workshop: Proofs and Linguis-
tics Categories–Applications of Logic to the analysis and implementation
of Natural Language, pages 199–208, 1996.
[15] Dag Elgesem. The modal logic of agency. Nordic J. Philos. Logic, 2(2),
1997.
[16] Pawel Garbacz. The four dimensions of artifacts. In Principles of Knowl-
edge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Ninth International
Conference (KR2004), pages 289–299, 2004.
[17] Jean-Yves Girard. Linear logic. Theor. Comput. Sci., 50(1):1–101, 1987.
[18] Jean-Yves Girard. Towards a Geometry of Interaction. Contemporary
Mathematics, 92:69–108, 1989.
[19] Guido Governatori and Antonino Rotolo. On the Axiomatisation of Elge-
sem’s Logic of Agency and Ability. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 34:403–
431, 2005.
[20] James Harland and Michael Winikoff. Agent negotiation as proof search in
linear logic. In Proc. 1st Int’l Joint Conf. on Auton. Agents and Multiagent
Sys. (AAMAS-2002), 2002.
[21] Wybo Houkes and Pieter E. Vermaas. Technical Functions (On the Use
and Design of Artefacts), volume 1 of Philosophy of Engineering and Tech-
nology. Springer, 2010.
30
[22] Norihiro Kamide. A simplified semantics for a fragment of intuitionistic
linear logic. Bulletin of the Section of Logic, 32(3):123–129, 2003.
[23] Norihiro Kamide. Linear and affine logics with temporal, spatial and epis-
temic operators. Theor. Comput. Sci., 353(1-3):165–207, 2006.
[24] Stig Kanger and Helle Kanger. Rights and Parliamentarism. Theoria,
32:85–115, 1966.
[25] Max I. Kanovich, Mitsuhiro Okada, and Kazushige Terui. Intuitionistic
phase semantics is almost classical. Mathematical. Structures in Comp.
Sci., 16(1):67–86, February 2006.
[26] Max I. Kanovich and Jacqueline Vauzeilles. The classical ai planning prob-
lems in the mirror of horn linear logic: semantics, expressibility, complexity.
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science, 11(6):689–716, 2001.
[27] Peter Kroes. Technical Artefacts: Creations of Mind and Matter (A Phi-
losophy of Engineering Design), volume 6 of Philosophy of Engineering and
Technology. Springer, 2012.
[28] Joachim Lambek. The mathematics of sentence structure. Amer. Math.
Monthly, 65(3):154–170, 1958.
[29] Patrick Lincoln, John C. Mitchell, Andre Scedrov, and Natarajan Shankar.
Decision problems for propositional linear logic. Ann. Pure Appl. Logic,
56(1–3):239–311, 1992.
[30] Luc Lismont and Philippe Mongin. A non-minimal but very weak axiom-
atization of common belief. Artif. Intell., 70(1-2):363–374, 1994.
[31] Mathieu Marion and Mehrnouche Sadrzadeh. Reasoning about knowl-
edge in linear logic: Modalities and complexity. In Shahid Rahman, John
Symons, DovM. Gabbay, and JeanPaulvan Bendegem, editors, Logic, Epis-
temology, and the Unity of Science, volume 1, pages 327–350. Springer
Netherlands, 2004.
[32] Chris Martens, Anne-Gwenn Bosser, Joa˜o F. Ferreira, and Marc Cavazza.
Linear logic programming for narrative generation. In Logic Program-
ming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning, 12th International Conference, LP-
NMR 2013, Corunna, Spain, September 15-19, 2013. Proceedings, pages
427–432, 2013.
[33] Peter W. O’Hearn and David J. Pym. The logic of bunched implications.
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, pages 215–244, 1999.
[34] Marc Pauly. A Modal Logic for Coalitional Power in Games. J. Log.
Comput., 12(1):149–166, 2002.
31
[35] Gordon D. Plotkin and Colin Stirling. A framework for intuitionistic modal
logics. In Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rea-
soning about Knowledge, Monterey, CA, March 1986, pages 399–406, 1986.
[36] Daniele Porello. A proof-theoretical view of collective rationality. In IJCAI
2013, Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, Beijing, China, August 3-9, 2013, 2013.
[37] Daniele Porello and Ulle Endriss. Modelling combinatorial auctions in linear
logic. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on the Principles
of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR-2010), May 2010.
[38] Daniele Porello and Ulle Endriss. Modelling multilateral negotiation in
linear logic. In ECAI 2010 - 19th European Conference on Artificial Intel-
ligence, Lisbon, Portugal, August 16-20, 2010, Proceedings, pages 381–386,
2010.
[39] Daniele Porello and Nicolas Troquard. A resource-sensitive logic of agency.
In ECAI 2014 - 21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 18-22
August 2014, Prague, Czech Republic - Including Prestigious Applications
of Intelligent Systems (PAIS 2014), pages 723–728, 2014.
[40] Ingmar Po¨rn. Action Theory and Social Science: Some Formal Models.
Synthese Library 120. D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1977.
[41] David Pym and Chris Tofts. A calculus and logic of resources and processes.
Formal Aspects of Computing, 18(4):495–517, 2006.
[42] David J. Pym, Peter W. O’Hearn, and Hongseok Yang. Possible worlds and
resources: The semantics of BI. Theoretical Computer Science, 315(1):257–
305, 2004.
[43] Christian Retore´. Pomset logic: a non-commutative extension of classical
linear logic. In Typed Lambda Calculi and Applications, pages 300–318.
Springer, 1997.
[44] Alex K Simpson. The proof theory and semantics of intuitionistic modal
logic. 1994.
[45] Anne Sjerp Troelstra. Lectures on Linear Logic. CSLI Publications, 1992.
[46] Nicolas Troquard. Reasoning about coalitional agency and ability in the
logics of ”bringing-it-about”. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Sys-
tems, 28(3):381–407, 2014.
[47] Alasdair Urquhart. Semantics for relevant logics. J. Symb. Log., 37(1):159–
169, 1972.
[48] Moshe Y. Vardi. On epistemic logic and logical omniscience. In Proceedings
of the 1st Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge,
pages 293–305. Morgan Kaufmann, 1986.
32
